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ple, in the plains between the Drava and Sava rivers, showed cultural and personality traits similar to those of the Old-Slavonic plowmen.[30]

In their migration, these early Slav soil cultivators were often able to Slavicize the natives among whom they had settled and even to absorb the numerically small bands of steppe raiders who had conquered them. These assimilated invaders were then often employed to fight against new nomadic incursions.[31] It was in the course of such acculturations, due to migrations and conquests, that in the regions between the Volga and the Dnieper a peculiar fusion of contrasting cultural patterns of the steppe horsemen and of the tillers of the soil had developed. Structural relations, personality traits and the religious, social and political ideologies that resulted out of this blend of the two conflicting worlds formed the basis of Russian society and have been at the root of its political instability throughout centuries.[32]

4
TURCO-MONGOL INVASIONS AND FORMATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

I

THE MOUNTED warriors of the steppes were accustomed to covering great distances on their raids and migrations. After they had devastated and annihilated much that was in their way, they would impose their rule with ease over whatever was left. Then they would proceed to organize nomadic federations, principalities and empires.[1] The political systems which thus arose in the area between the Ural mountains and the Carpathians apparently followed the pattern that had been originally established by the Scythians and Huns in the same territory.[2]

Being extremely self-centered and insecure, a strong driving

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force behind the war expeditions of these predatory warriors might have been their need for self-assertion and dominance, as well as an urge for destruction. They were therefore likely to indulge in sadistic cruelty and in mass plunder, in lechery and debauchery.

It is important to notice, however, that in these conquests the mounted nomads would often invade and settle distant areas without their womenfolk. Therefore, when these womenless, predatory, patriarchal and polygynous horsemen invaded the plains and river valleys between the Ural mountains and the Carpathians, where the Old-Slavonic soil cultivators, Fino-Ugric hunters and other folks were settled, the newcomers not only imposed themselves as political rulers, but it became necessary for them to abduct native women *en masse*, to buy them, or to demand them as a tribute, and make them their wives, concubines, and slaves. Not only the historical records but the Great-Russian marriage customs, folk poetry and other oral literature testify to this trend of events. Marriage by capture, bride price and the use of women as slave laborers figure prominently in all these documents.

At first a great cultural diversity in the society at large resulted out of such a situation. Many early observers of the peoples of this area noticed this phenomenon. Often the customs of the peoples that went under the same name were very dissimilar. The same names covered a conglomeration of tillers of the soil, pastoral nomads, nomadic hunters, and warlike tribes. Some of these people were matriarchal, others patriarchal. Some of them lived in wagons and tents, others built houses. Some cremated their dead, others practiced inhumation. Some were cannibalistic, others vegetarians.[3]

It is for this reason that early observers when speaking of "Slavs" sometimes give contradictory data.[4] Such accounts are likely to confuse a student of early Slav society unless he keeps in mind the ethnical mixture and blending of cultures that was taking place in that area in the course of many centuries. Tacitus, for instance, noticed that "The Veneti [Slavs] have borrowed largely from Sarmatian character; in their plundering expeditions they roam over the whole extent of forests and mountains. . . ."[5]

[3] [i.e. of the Turko-Mongols — Analyst]

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territories. He was adorned with the title of the "Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Russias,"[4] a symbolic beginning of Russian religious and political unity.

When the Tartars in the beginning of the thirteenth century imposed their overlordship over all Russian lands, lacking an efficient administration and interested not so much in governing as in tributes, they restored to the native princes their old titles and gave them the right to collect tributes for them. In this manner in the beginning of the fourteenth century Ivan Kalita of Moscow succeeded in obtaining a *yarlyk* (charter of privileges) in which the Tartar Kahn recognized Ivan as the *Veliky Knyaz* (Grand Prince). A few years later Ivan also became the chief collector of tributes for the Kahn in Russian lands.

In his function as chief farmer of internal revenues Ivan practiced extortion from his Russian subjects and acquired a great personal wealth. His riches enabled him to purchase entire domains and apanages, and to buy the protection and backing of the Kahn. Seeing the ascendency of Ivan, and following Byzantine traditions of Church and state unity, the Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Russias moved his residence to Moscow and built a cathedral there, ready to support Moscow princes in their political ambitions.

The expansion of Moscow's power over other Russian lands was favored also by external circumstances and pressures. By the second part of the fourteenth century the central authority of the Tartar Empire, the Golden Horde, had weakened and as was customary in Turco-Mongol society, civil wars ensued among the contenders for the throne. This situation presented an opportunity for power wise princes of Moscow to change their policy of cringing and prostration before the Tartars into that of rebellion and bargain. From now on at times they fought the Tartars, at other times they were again kneeling before them; but they now knew how to take advantage of Tartar weaknesses and how to gain new possessions with Tartar assistance. In this policy of expansion at the expense of other Russian principalities the Muscovites had the support not only of the Khans but that of the Eastern Orthodox clergy as well. Their

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From its very inception the Russian state was a military Soc i-
ety. The military campaigns and territorial expansion were needed in this society to provide land to pay for the services of a class of military nobility whose chief occupation was state service and warfare, not land cultivation. War gave the Czar an opportunity to distribute land grants, to bestow ranks and offices and to win the support of the nobility. At the same time warfare offered an opportunity for the nobles to exert more personal power, to release their destructive urges, and to compensate for indignities and humiliations to which they were constantly exposed on the part of superiors in rank and office. Thus, by engaging these people in constant warfare the Czars directed their aggressive impulses against the enemy instead of against the ruler. The wars were not only a means of occupying a potentially restless and turbulent military class, but they were necessary to enhance the Czar's prestige, to solidify his rule, and to impress his subjects with the idea of his might and invincibility.

In such circumstances, prolonged and costly wars were to be avoided. The military nobility, whose loyalty to the Czar was conditioned upon his power and favors, could not be completely depended upon to remain loyal to the Czar under adverse conditions or in defeat. Therefore, in military campaigns the emphasis had to be put on numerical superiority over the enemy. Another way of fighting the enemies was to frighten them into retreat by sudden and unexpected attacks from ambush combined with wild sounds of the drums, trumpets and shouting, in Mongol fashion. Soldiers and officers were ready to flee if the enemy showed considerable resistance. Their preference was fighting from a distance, or from a place of advantage from where they could annoy the enemy, but hurt themselves least.[16] Hence their most common way of taking cities and fortresses was by a siege, in the course of which they would force the population to surrender by means of mass starvation, or by provoking internal dissensions and treachery.[17] Small, weak and unprotected adversaries would be threatened into submission by "psychological warfare" methods without even resorting to an open war.[18]

In earlier days, the means employed to keep conquered people in submission were the same as those practiced toward Russian

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subjects: coercion and dependency. One such method was to massacre a large part of the population, to loot the conquered territories, and to leave those that remained alive in abject misery. The plunder of the conquered peoples sometimes went to such extremes that they were exposed to prolonged famines and food had to be brought from Moscow to save the remaining populace from starving to death.

When a non-Russian territory had been brought to impotence by such means the Muscovite rulers would settle the Russian people among the natives, dividing the territory into a number of administrative units. The next step was to appoint persons who were strangers to those places to govern them. Following the Mongol pattern, these governors were changed often and never allowed to stay long enough to become friendly with the natives and to develop a genuine local power of their own. As a rule, in one and the same place two personages would be appointed, one of higher nobility to hold the office in name, and the other of lower nobility to control the former. Moreover, special overseers and watchdogs were periodically sent directly from Moscow to spy and check on both.[19]

This system of checking on persons who held high offices was practiced also in the army where large army units were headed by persons of the old high nobility, who were not trusted. To these nominal commanders, officers of lesser nobility would be appointed as deputy commanders. It was often these "political commissars" who had the real power.[20]

Just as in the tribes and states of the steppes the conquered people were kept in subjugation also by fomenting continual dissension between various classes and within each class of the population. The Czar at the same time relied on the numerical strength and loyalty of his personal guards and selected garrisons which were strategically distributed throughout the conquered country. The conquered people, brought thus by the conqueror to helplessness, fell to their knees and begged their overlords for mercy.

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women as stupid and nasty, conceited and licentious, and as the mainspring of all calamities of the world.[10] But Tolstoy, too, like the Russian popular view of life, did make a distinction between the woman and the mother.[11]

Hostile drives, mistrust and destructive aggression might be revealed also in attitudes towards strangers. These are sometimes likened to animals, especially dogs. Comparing people with beasts indicates an inclination to abase them and to mistreat them. Such an attitude is shown especially toward those who are considered to be "enemies." When talking about the Tartars, the people would say "the dog of a Tartar." In a like way, xenophobia was manifested in the attitudes toward the "thrice accursed Latins," that is, the Western, non-Orthodox peoples.

Perhaps this need to abuse and to destroy in order to demonstrate one's power was manifested also in treatment of those who were abandoned and helpless, such as prisoners in foreign wars, as well as prisoners in rebellions and civil wars at home, or convicted criminals. In the rebellions and civil wars atrocities were committed by both sides, the government troops and the rebels, the Orthodox and the Dissenters, the Whites and the Reds. In a similar manner convicted criminals, domestic servants and serfs were often used as targets of destructive aggression.

Tendency to abuse was manifested also in the relations between merchants and customers, capital and labor. In the lowest strata ruthless self-seeking took also the form of begging. There was a great number of beggars; begging became a widely spread business. Some of the beggars became people of considerable means. Leaders among the beggars would mutilate, deprive of eyesight, and deform healthy men and boys to use them as their instruments in begging. Entire villages, and even some regions were said to have made begging their regular profession.[12]

II

In circumstances where power-seeking, destructive aggression and mistrust prevail any accident may be interpreted as a sign of another person's hostile intentions. The other person tends to be looked upon as a potential enemy. "You mustn't stroke anyone's head—you might get your hand bitten off," said Lenin.[13] And as

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Thwarted in their drive for power and political leadership, these young men and women gave vent to their feelings of deprivation in phantasies and plans of destruction and death.

Much of the sadness, tragic sarcasm, morbidity and preoccupation with death and suffering which dominated Russian literature in the second part of the nineteenth century reflects such moods of despair. The predominance of social and political themes in the literary creations of these people and the insistence of literary critics of those days on literary "realism," that is, that a work of art should be judged not by artistic and esthetic criteria but by its portrayal of existing life and its faithfulness to reality, especially the brutal and dark reality, manifested the same feelings.

Pisarev, describing this psychological reaction of impotence and the urge for destruction before seemingly uncontrollable forces, stated that when men "find it impossible to transform life, their anger at their own impotence makes itself felt in the sphere of thought, where the destructive work of criticism proceeds unceasingly."[6] That the basic drive behind this urge for negation and destruction was extreme self-seeking is witnessed by some other ideas of the same writer. "Every living being," said Pisarev, "is for himself the center and the meaning of the universe . . . his personal joys, vexations, aspirations, and cares, are more important than universal revolutions. . . ."

Starting with such premises, some of the Nihilists refused to recognize any regulation, any moral law, any principle, whether above, external, or within a person as being "absolute." The result was preaching of extreme materialism and individualism, and denial of all "absolute" ethics, of duty and of responsibility, of ideals and of social values.

II

In the meantime, however, the effects of European revolutions of 1848 and the defeats of the Russian armies in the Crimean War (1854–1856) led some of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia to the belief that the Czarist system was not as invulnerable as generally accepted. These people proposed direct and organized action against the Czarist regime in order to raze it to

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level violence was manifested in frequent beatings of wife and children, and on the rural community level in habitual drunkenness that often ended in brawls and even murder.[18] In conditions which foster human degradation and lack of trust, both self-seeking and vindictiveness flourish. Hence the Great-Russian peasant was inclined to commit atrocious acts of revenge against people whom he considered as his persecutors or who caused him any harm. When threatening with revenge the Great-Russian peasant was likely to say: "You will pay me with your own blood" (*Ty u menya kroviyu svoey umoeshsya*). Killing as a revenge, burning hay-ricks, barns and homes was a common occurrence. The peasants were likely to organize a collective hunt against real or fancied malefactors and mutilate them or put them to death by means of torture:

> For murder and robbery, death of the culprit—sometimes with mutilation by cutting and tearing off of various parts of his body. For horse-theft and grand larceny they practice sometimes hammering of iron nails into the head and forcing of wooden pins under the nails and also merciless beating even onto death; . . . in some instances the case ends by maiming the thief and letting him go.[19]

At the same time the frontiersmen and professional warriors, such as the Cossacks, became renowned and widely admired because of their deeds of vindictiveness and violence. War was a great opportunity for people with such inclinations. As Gogol has put it, the Cossacks found a great delight in "accumulating booty from raided towns, putting the villages and the fields on fire, and spreading their glories by far and wide throughout the steppe" in order "to revenge themselves for all evil and humiliation."[20] There were numerous robber and Cossack songs which told about such exploits, and expressed desire for vindictiveness and destructive aggression.

Destructive aggression was nursed on the patriarchal family level and reinforced by conditions in the local community. Thus as soon as the controls of the authorities would weaken, mass revolts would come into the open. Such a behavior in turn was used by the local authorities as a justification for their strictness in dealing with the peasants:

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Pensa gubernia rose against the landlords with the slogan "Liberty and Land" (*Zemlya i Volya*).[4] Ever since they had been enserfed and bound to the land, the peasants kept in cherished memory the *Yuriev den*, St. George's day, the day when in earlier times each peasant was allowed to leave his landlord (*vykhod*). The peasants' demand for freedom from bondage was as strong as their demand for land. When the ideas of personal, economic and political freedoms started to penetrate Russia from the European West, also, the Russian peasants, owing to a growing contact with the city and the intelligentsia, became affected by them and in consequence revolts were increasing in number. Between 1826 and 1830 there were 41 cases of peasant rebellions and between 1858–1860 there were 284 such uprisings.[5]

It is significant to note that these peasant rebellions became especially prominent and especially widely spread each time the ruling class had suffered loss of prestige, such as in case of defeat on the battlefield. During the Crimean War in 1854 and 1855 widespread peasant uprisings took place on the shores of the Volga, and in central and southwestern gubernias, the Vladimir, Ryasan, Tambov, Pensa, and Voronezh.[6] In these provinces the mir institution prevailed and periodical redistribution of land was practiced. Here also reaction against abusive and humiliating conditions of serfdom was very intense and demand for land became very strong. In these provinces the traditions of earlier revolts were fresh in the memory of the peasantry. In addition, growing density of population and increasing land shortage tended to strengthen the revolutionary attitudes of the peasants. Their hostilities turned against the landlords whom they blamed for all their ills and misfortunes.

II

The defeat in the Crimean War and the internal disturbances which followed that war forced the Czarist government to undertake measures to reorganize its armed forces and to stabilize the regime internally. After being defeated by technologically and politically superior enemies, the Czarist government finally realized that in order to improve Russia's fighting effectiveness vis-a-vis the West, higher state revenues were needed and these

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could be achieved only if Russia was to change radically its economic structure. As a result of such a trend of events and of thought the government passed a decree in 1861 according to which the peasants were set legally free from their masters.

As a consequence of his legal emancipation, the peasant found himself in the possession of less arable land than before, and he was still bound to it. He was overburdened even more than before because he was obliged to pay high redemption dues in addition to the heavy taxes that were imposed on him. Moreover the peasants in land communes not only remained jointly responsible to the government for the payment of taxes, but they were also made jointly responsible for redemption payments. The commune's authority over the peasants was increased and the peasant found himself under an even more exacting and more despotic commune regimentation than the one that existed before the "Emancipation Act."

At the same time the peasant still did not have sufficient arable land. He also lacked pasture grounds and timber which were of special importance in his technologically backward and extensive agricultural economy; most of such land was left in the hands of his former masters. The acuteness of land shortage was especially felt because of lack of artificial fertilizers, need for draught animals, and primitiveness of farm equipment. Many peasants did not even possess a wooden plow.

But though the emancipation act of 1861 still kept the peasants bound to the land, and did not provide them with sufficient land, it did open up opportunities for their economic advance and political activation. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the peasantry became generally recognized as a potentially very significant force, both politically and economically. It was this prospect of the peasant masses as the leading political power of the future in combination with the Slavophil idealization of the peasantry that gave rise to the ideology of *narodnichestvo* (populism). This ideology idealized the virtues and the creative potentialities of the peasantry, and just as the Slavophils, the narodniki claimed that the reconstruction of Russian society, even of the whole world, will come from Russian peasantry.

By the end of that century a faction of Russian radical intel-

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the peasantry, and appealed to their deeply rooted hostilities against the ruling classes, and against all people of means. In their proclamations to the peasantry they stated that "the land belongs to those who till it." They incited the peasants to appropriate by force hay, pasture, and timber. They also encouraged violence and murder against all those whom they held responsible for their plight.[9]

As a result of such propaganda and agitation combined with economic and social difficulties, peasant disturbances were renewed and increased in frequency and intensity. They led to the events of 1905. That year the government suffered a considerable loss of prestige because of the defeat on the battlefield (the Japanese War of 1904–1905). In such circumstances (the same as after the Crimean War), fear and awe and unconditional obedience—the foundations of Czarist rule—were shaken, internal disturbances ensued and threatened the existence of the Czardom. By this time the revolutionary eruptions of the peasantry were combined with those of the industrial proletariat. Between January and April, 1905, there were about 660,000 workers on economic and political strikes.[10] In October of the same year there was again a general strike.

In that month also a general peasant rising took place embracing three hundred districts in 47 gubernias. Again it was the central and southern regions that took the lead;[11] and again the gubernias in which the landlords suffered the heaviest losses were predominantly those where the system of repartitional land tenure prevailed over the system of individual peasant households and of hereditary holdings. In the communities with communal land holdings the dissatisfaction was greatest and violence ran especially high.

The activities of the Social Revolutionaries in the village were joined by those of the Bolsheviks. By the beginning of the twentieth century a wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, the Bolsheviks, who earlier scorned the peasants and worked exclusively among the urban proletariat, began to pay more attention to the Russian village. They became impressed by the frequency and the intensity of the peasants' disturbances and realized that the peasantry presented potentially very ex-

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self. And after the army which Czar Nicholas personally commanded in 1917 had suffered defeats at the hands of the enemies, and the chiefs of the armed forces suggested to the Czar that he should resign, he realized that his prestige had fallen and his authority gone. As out of spite he abdicated not only for himself but for his heirs as well. And as it has already happened in Russia's past, when the central authority suffered defeat and loss of prestige, all seething internal forces of revolt, relieved of the controls that kept them under check, burst out in violent eruptions. In such circumstances everybody deserted the Czar, even the Orthodox Church:

> Even the Orthodox Clergy, that class that had been an integrated part of the Czarist system deserted the Czar in the hour of his doom. Showing as much lack of a sense of proportion as the other classes of Russian society the official hierarchy went as far as to pass a decision according to which all lines containing the word "king" in the Psalms of David were to be deleted.[13]

III

All these circumstances, combined with the extreme factionalism within the intelligentsia, greatly facilitated the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks. All the four national *Dumas* which were convoked since 1905 were composed predominantly of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. The same situation existed in the leading circles of all political parties.[14] But in each party, self-centeredness and lust for power led the intelligentsia into constant bickering among themselves and neverending fighting for leadership, a situation that manifested itself in numerous party splits.

It was only in the Bolshevik Party that the Party's Central Committee was well disciplined and unified under one leader who had absolutist and dictatorial powers. This sitution spared the Party too many splits. This Bolshevik system favored the reduction of Party leadership to a rather small number of intellectuals who relied on the semi-intelligentsia and industrial workers in local Party work. It was this dictatorial, centralistic and "aristocratic" organization of the Bolsheviks, as well as the extreme ruthlessness and aggressiveness of its leaders and fanat-

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565 517 icism of its rank and file, that gave this Party an advantage over its main rival for power, the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, in the chaotic days of 1917.

● 727 669 565 Just as it had happened in the past, a weakening of the prestige of the ruling classes as a result of defeats on the battlefield led to peasant uprisings. Almost immediately after the Czar's abdication, that is, in March, 1917, peasant rebellions arose in 34 districts and by June spread to 325 districts. The distrubances were again especially intensive in the upper Don and in the middle Volga, the regions where the tradition of revolt was strong and the situation for revolt matured owing to unsatisfactory conditions within the land communes.

665 669 The chaos that ensued in the village was emphasized by factional strife and indecision in the center. As a result of the fall of the old Czarist regime, the two most extreme revolutionary parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, entered into a contest for power. While the Socialist Revolutionaries controlled the Provisional Government (since May, 1917), the Bolsheviks did everything to undermine their regime and to seize the power for themselves. In the question of rural policies, the government of Socialist Revolutionaries attempted to stop the outbreaks of lawlessness and disorder in the villages by promising an equitable solution of all rural problems on the basis of laws that were to be passed by a Constitutional Assembly.

[425] But the Bolsheviks counteracted such policies by inciting the peasants to seize the lands at once. The Bolsheviks also deliberately sharpened [565] the existing social cleavages in the villages by inciting the lower peasant strata against the upper. The Bolshevised soldiers, on leave or deserting the front, pushed more moderate elements into the background and led the peasant mobs not only against the landlords, but also against the more prosperous peasant classes. Hence, attacks on *Khutoryane* (hereditary peasant homestead owners) and *otrubniki* (peasant individual property owners) were as frequent as those against the manorial estates.

Many soldiers deserted the front because the Bolshevik agitators told them that the land was being distributed back home and that those who were present would get the choice grounds. The government, controlled by the Socialist Revolutionaries,

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in that family, the new circumstances call for more leniency and more intimacy on his part toward his wife and his children. The mother at the same time, because now closer to her husband, is in no need to become over-attached to her children. Such well-balanced family relations come to closely resemble those in the Old-Slavonic family.

It is the children with such close family ties in an emotionally balanced family atmosphere that develop traits of moderation, self-control, responsibility, group orientation and humane feelings. It is in such families that patriotism, idealization of the past and longing for a more humane and more equalitarian political system are nursed.[28] In such families skepticism concerning Bolshevik mythology and opposition to Soviet system may be safely expressed. In such families also religion is cultivated or secretly practiced.[29] In such families apparently numerous anecdotes which ridicule Soviet regime circulate and are spread throughout the Soviet Union.[30] It is to break such family intimacy and solidarity which breed opposition to their regime that the Bolsheviks have shown increasing concern for the control of family relations.

But if the opposition to the Bolshevik regime centers in such families of patriots and humanists, the fate of the Soviet system might rest upon them, in the final analysis. These people might be reluctant to support a Soviet war of aggression led by careerists and fanatics, but ready to defend their Mother Country in the event of hostile aggression from the outside. However, in a war against the Soviet Union which the patriots and the humanists would interpret as a war of liberation from the oppressive, inhuman and destructive policies of Soviet rulers, they might be inclined to take the side of the invading liberators. Inasmuch as such people already find themselves at the fringes of Soviet power structure as specialists and experts in economic management and government administration, in times of crisis the shift of power to these people could easily take place.

Such a trend of development will be even more emphasized among the oppressed, but nationally-conscious minorities, than among the dominant Great-Russians. Millions of Soviet subjects who willingly gave themselves up to the German invaders and

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welcomed them as liberators in World War II, indicate such possibilities.

III

In studying personality growth in the Soviet society, one should take into account also the differences between the urban and the rural environments and the influences of those environments on interpersonal relations within the family circle. Owing to the very rapid pace of urbanization and low rate of production of consumption goods, most of the families located in the urban areas are exposed to the housing shortage and lack of home privacy. Many of these families live in community apartments in which there is only one room per family and in which a number of unrelated families share a common kitchen and toilet facilities. Family conflicts and tensions tend to be intensified in such circumstances. Lack of privacy, noisiness, and lack of sleep in crowded quarters, together with the lack of sufficient food, long hours of work and unsatisfactory conditions of work increase dissatisfactions and magnify existing family conflicts. An outlet for dissatisfactions is found then in trivial scandals and bickering, in petty squabbles, but also in violent emotional outbursts.[31]

Conditions in rural areas are somewhat different. Though virtually all peasant families live in one or at most two-room cottages, which they often share with a few heads of livestock, yet the rural family does have its own privacy. Most peasant families possess a small lot of land around the cottage, on which they raise some poultry or a pig; some might even own a cow. Though this is all very modest, yet with some labor, after the work for the kolhoz has been done, the peasant family has been able to raise some food on its own property and perhaps to sell it on the open market and then buy some clothing and other bare necessities.[32]

Compared to the situation of the city worker, the peasant, though receiving lower wages for his work, and often going in rags, perhaps does feel relatively more independent. If he is an adult with a family he is much less likely to be pushed around, though he is constantly exhorted by kolhoz officials to work more

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or death" (*povinovenie ili smert*) in their rule; thus terror has become one of the main instruments of their power.

But once self-seeking careerists and fanatical devotees, specialists in violence, conspiracy and vigilance take into their hands the reins of a society which they indoctrinate with hatred and ruthlessness, the value of human life tends to be greatly lowered. In their constant struggle for survival, fear-ridden and extremely insecure, these people are forced to adopt an attitude of expendability toward all their subjects, just as earlier the Anarchists and Terrorists considered that all their members were only capital to be freely spent in the interest of the revolution.

In such conditions the disregard for individual rights and needs, and lack of consideration and of human feeling become generalized and are applied not only in dealings with enemies, but also in relations with associates, relatives, friends, allies and subjects in general whenever the vested interests of the ruling clique are threatened. The orders and the plans must be fulfilled; the victories must be made no matter what the cost in personal freedom and dignity, human suffering and human lives, because it is these orders, plans, and victories upon which the survival and the perpetuation of the ruling faction depends. All those who are in the way must be unconditionally sacrificed. Said Stalin:

> . . . it [is] easy to be a hero or a great leader if one had to do with the people such as the Russians . . . even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who do not . . . are killed.[26]

This attitude of disregard and contempt for human life when the survival of the ruling class and its vested interests are in question was expressed by Stalin also in his known interview with G. B. Wells. The magnitude of convict labor establishments, the police practices, and the extent of economic and other deprivations to which the Soviet subjects are exposed are all manifestations of this frame of mind.

The low value which is placed on human life in Bolshevik ideology is especially well demonstrated in war times. The Soviet armed forces command does not assess the cost of war in terms

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of human lives. Soviet military policies are little concerned about systematic rotation of units, facilities for recreation, short leaves and furloughs, regular correspondence with home folks, or with the development of techniques to avoid exposure of men to unnecessary risks.[27] As a result of such attitudes the toll of a Soviet division in war time might come up to 90 percent of its men.[28] Even more indifference is shown toward men who were made prisoners, since "they had surrendered and could not fight any more."[29]

IV

Destructive aggressiveness might become self-destructive unless turned outward. Hence constant internal pressure, intrinsic to Soviet power structure, for aggression against the outside world. A policy of external aggressiveness is likely to provoke external threats against which the accumulating hostilities of the subjects can be mobilized. Successful external aggression is also a convenient way to bolster the prestige of the ruling class and to solidify its rule. The policy of aggression against the outside world implies also the urgency to enhance external security should the policy of expansion provoke international complications.

Early in the development of Bolshevik rule the Communist International and the Communist parties throughout the world have been regimented and employed as instruments of this policy of external expansion, as well as a means of defense against external pressures. It was in accordance with such a trend of events that the Program of the Communist International of 1928, as well as the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International of 1935,[30] emphasized complete identification of the world proletariat with the Soviet power:

> Our road is the road of revolution of the peoples against the oppressors and exploiters. Our will is the will of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Our goal is socialism for the whole of humanity. Our main slogan is the establishment of Soviet power.[31]

In accordance with such need for outward aggression as a relief of internal destructive tensions an ideological distinction